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DISCOVERY AND PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE 
IN ADVERSARY AND NONADVERSARY 
PROCEEDINGS 
E. Allan Lind,* John Thibaut** & Laurens Walker*** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
IN one important respect, the judicial process is analogous to the scientific method. Each must be seen by the public as objective 
and rational, exhibiting procedures that combat bias and irrelevancy. 
This analogy suggested to us that the capacity of the Anglo-American 
adversary system1 to produce objective and rational decisions could 
be empirically tested. Specifically, we devised an experiment in which 
a series of planned variations in the judicial process was introduced 
into a controlled setting. By comparing the measurable effects of 
these changes, the variable that maximizes the quality of the decision 
making may be identified. A similar research design was used in two 
prior studies in which the decision maker was the center of interest. 
The first investigated the ability of the adversary system to combat 
decision maker bias;2 the second examined decision maker bias caused 
by the order of presentation at trial.3 The present study shifts atten-
tion to the attorney, and asks how attorney discovery and transmis-
sion of evidence affects another important potential source of bias: 
the factual basis of a decision. 
This investigation began, as did our first study, with the exami-
• Graduate Student, University of North Carolina. B.A. 1970, University of Florida; 
M.A. 1972, University of North Carolina.-Ed. 
•• Professor of Psychology, University of North Carolina. A.B. 1939, University of 
North Carolina; Ph.D. 1949, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.-Ed . 
... Professor of Law, University of North Carolina Law School. A.B. 1959, David-
son College; J.D. 1963, Duke University; S.J.D. 1970, Harvard University.-Ed. 
The research reported in this article is a product of the project "Human Behavior 
and the Legal Process," which is supported by National Science Foundation Grant 
GS-28590X. 
1. A general description of the adversary decision-making model is found in F. 
JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1.2 (1965); Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERI-
CAN LAw 34 (H. Berman ed. 1971); Joint Conf. on Professional Responsibility, Report, 
44 A.B.A.J. 1159 (1958); and Davis & Foster, The Judicial Process and Social Change, in 
SOCIETY AND nm LAw 95, 96-101 (F. Davis, et al. ed. 1962). A comparison with the in-
quisitorial system is made in Lacy, "Civilizing" Nonjury Trials, 19 VAND. L. R.Ev. 73 
(1965) and Ploscowe, The Development of Present-Day Criminal Procedures in Europe 
and America, 48 HARV. L. R.Ev. 433 (1935). The leading critic of the adversary system was 
Judge Jerome Frank. See J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 80-102 (1949). 
2. Thibaut, Walker & Lind, Adversary Presentation and Bias in Legal Decision Mak-
ing, 86 HARV. L. REV. 386 (1972). 
3. Walker, Thibaut & Andreoli, Order of Presentation at Trial, 82 YALE L.J. 216 
(1972). 
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nation of a major advantage claimed on behalf of the Anglo-Amer-
ican adversary system: that attorneys in an adversary system provide 
better discovery and transmission of information to legal decision 
makers than do attorneys in an inquisitorial system.4 As one Amer-
ican legal theorist has written: "The adversary system presupposes 
that the most effective means of determining truth is to place upon 
a skilled advocate for each side the responsibility for investigating 
and presenting the facts from a partisan perspective. Thus, the like-
lihood is maximized that all relevant facts will be ferreted out and 
placed before the ultimate fact finder in as persuasive a manner as 
possible."5 
A combination of two elements identifies the variations necessary 
to evaluate the claim. The first element is the assignment of the 
attorney's own role. In the Anglo-American adversary system he is 
conditioned to be "client-centered."6 This conditioning is further 
reinforced by contingent fees and attorney compensation based on 
services rendered.7 The second element is the attorney's perception 
of his opponent's role. In the adversary system, the attorney under-
stands that because his opponent is also client-centered by instruction 
and incentive, the relationship of the two advocates is largely oppo-
sitional. These two elements can be easily altered to simulate the 
other systems in order to test the claimed advantage. If the attorney's 
o·wn role assignment remains client-centered, but his perception of 
his opponent's role is changed from client-centered to court-centered,8 
the model becomes equivalent to a partly inquisitorial or "mixed" 
system. This model is similar to the process employed in German 
criminal courts, where the defense counsel is client-centered, but the 
4. E. MORGAN, SOlllE PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF 
LmGATION 3 (1956); Barret, The Adversary System and the Ethics of Advocacy, 37 
NoTRE DAME LAw. 479, 481 (1962). While the attorney in a pure adversary system has 
no counterpart in the ideal inquisitorial system, where the decision maker actively in-
vestigates the claims of unrepresented litigants, in practice inquisitorial systems have 
made substantial use of attorneys in the production of evidence. See Lacy, supra note I, 
at 75-82; Thibaut, Walker & Lind, supra note 2, at 388-89. 
5. Freedman, Professional Responsibilities of the Civil Practitioner, in EouCATION 
IN THE PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITIES OF THE LAWYER 151, 152 (D. ·weckstein ed. 1970). 
6. The attorney's role is explained in Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility: "The duty of a lawyer, both to his client and to the legal system, is to represent 
his client zealously within the bounds of the law ••.• " ABA, CooE OF PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY, Canon EC 7-1. 
7. The traditional private financing arrangements are outlined in Canon 2 of the 
Code of Professional Responsibility. The contingent fee, which is expressly allowed by 
Canon EC 2-20, probably provides the strongest reinforcement of the role assignment. 
8. This change can be made by informing one attorney that his opponent's first 
responsibility is to assist the court in producing a just result and that his opponent's 
outcome will be determined by the court based on his performance. 
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prosecutor is less of an advocate for the state than in the Anglo-
American adversary system.9 If the attorney's perception of his own 
role is also changed to court-centered, the new model becomes still 
more inquisitorial and antithetical to the adversary system and its 
claimed advantage. This model is similar to the Soviet criminal sys-
tem, where the primary duty of both attorneys seems to be assisting 
the court in reaching a just result.10 
In order to evaluate fully the advantage claimed for the adversary 
model we sought to add a third element that would test the hypoth-
esis under a variety of conditions. The degree to which the evidence 
discovered in a case favors one party at the expense of another ap-
peared to meet this criterion. This fact-distribution element is a per-
vasive condition of legal conflict resolution that, intuition suggests, 
may significantly influence information search and transmission. Fur-
ther, this variable could be easily and accurately controlled by regu-
lating the flow of favorable information acquired by the subjects 
during the experiment. 
The remainder of this article reports a laboratory experiment in-
tended to cast light on both the specific claim made on behalf of the 
adversary system and the nature of information processing in legal 
systems generally. 
II. METHOD 
A. Procedure 
The one hundred and four first-year law students participating 
in the experiment were told to act as attorneys in a criminal case.11 
9. The role of the West German defense counsel is described in BRAO § I, Schon-
felder, Deutsche Gesetze (C.H. Beck 1969). See also K. PETERS, STRAFPROZESS 182-83 (2d 
ed. 1966). The prosecutor's role is illustrated in STPO § 160(2), Schonfelder, Deutsche 
Gesetze (C.H. Beck 1970). See also K. PETERS, supra, at 139; Schweichel, Die Zukunft der 
Staatsanwaltschaft, 1970 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR REcHTSPOLmK 171-74. 
IO. The role of the Soviet defense attorney is described in R. CONQUEST, JusncE AND 
THE LEGAL SYsrEM IN THE U.S.S.R. 32-39 (1968) and Comment, The Role of Defense 
Counsel in Soviet Criminal Proceedings, 1968 WIS. L. REv. 806. The prosecutor's role is 
described in R. CONQUEST, supra, at 40-46. 
II. The case was lHitten to turn on the single issue of whether the defendant's 
violent response to an assault was justified. The case was described to the law students 
by a brief summary which stated that Adams and Zemp had been close friends for 
years. The two friends had begun to gamble heavily together and eventually met at a 
tavern to discuss their now involved relationship. After a period of conversation, Zemp 
knocked Adams to the floor and threw an object in his direction. Adams responded by 
stabbing Zemp in the stomach with a piece of glass. The summary concluded with the 
statement of a self-defense rule: "The law provides that it is unlawful to use more 
force in repelling an attack than a person believes necessary, or than a reasonable 
person would believe necessary in the same or similar circumstances." Additional facts 
about the case were created for use in the development and presentation task, and 
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It was explained that there would be two phases to the task: The 
first phase would consist of an investigation; the second would com-
prise the transmission of facts to the trier.12 The investigation in-
volved purchasing facts from the experimenter. The students were 
given five opportunities to purchase as many or as few facts as they 
wished. Any purchase required a specified expenditure of points, 
which the students were instructed to maximize.13 The expenditure 
of points was intended to be analogous to the expenditure of time 
and effort by an attorney in an actual investigation.14 
The second phase of the experiment began as soon as both attor-
neys had completed all five fact-buying opportunities. During this 
phase the attorneys selected the facts that they wished to transmit 
to the trier of fact. When both attorneys had decided which facts 
they wished to present, a post-experimental questionnaire was ad-
ministered to assess their perceptions of the experimental situation.lli 
B. Experimental Manipulations 
Three factors were systematically varied within the experimental 
situation described above. Before they began the investigation phase, 
half of the students were given client-centered role instructions, while 
the remaining half were given court-centered role instructions. Attor-
neys who received client-centered role instructions were told that 
they were to advance the interests of one of the parties and that 
their own monetary outcomes in the experiment were partially con-
tingent upon a favorable verdict. In contrast, the court-centered role 
instructions told the attorneys to help the judge arrive at "as fair and 
accurate a decision as possible." Attorneys who received court-cen-
prior to the experiment these facts were scaled by eight law students according to the 
degree to which they were favorable to either Adams or Zemp. The Thurstone method 
of equal-appearing intervals was used. See L. THURSI"ONE, THE MEASUREMENT OF VALUES 
67-81 (1959). The case was very similar to that used in the two prior studies briefly 
described in the text accompanying notes 2 and 3 supra. 
12. The law students participated in the experiment two at a time. During the 
entire experiment they were separated in cubicles, and hence neither had knowledge of 
the specific actions of the other. 
13. The students were led to believe that their monetary outcomes would be par• 
tially determined by the number of points they had at the end of the task. 
14. The cost of the facts followed a positively accelerated function so that the more 
facts the law student purchased the greater was the cost of each new fact, just as the 
discovery of facts at hand is presumably less costly to an attorney than the later 
discovery of more remote facts. 
15. The questionnaire asked for ratings on seven-point Likert-type scales concerning 
reactions to the experimental situation. For example, the law students were asked to 
rate their own and their opponents' actions on a number of dimensions including 
cooperativeness, fairness, and peacefulness. 
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tered roles were instructed that their monetary outcomes in the 
experiment were not dependent upon the result in the case. 
The second factor varied in the experiment was the attorneys' 
perceptions of the role of the other attorney in the legal system. Half 
of the law students given client-centered instructions were told the 
other attorney had also received client-centered role instructions; half 
were told the other had received court-centered role instructions.16 
The same procedure was repeated with the law students receiving 
court-centered role instructions. Thus, client-centered attorneys op-
posed client-centered opponents (the adversary situation), client-cen-
tered attorneys confronted court-centered opponents (the "mixed" 
legal system as seen by its adversary members), court-centered at-
torneys faced client-centered opponents (the "mixed" system as seen 
by its inquisitorial members), and court-centered attorneys were 
paired with court-centered opponents (the inquisitorial system). 
The experiment was designed to permit control over a third fac-
tor-the percentage of favorable facts discovered by attorneys during 
their investigations. As the attorneys purchased facts they might find 
that 25 per cent, 50 per cent, or 75 per cent of the facts advanced 
their clients' interests.17 
III. RESULTS 
A. Perception of the Experimental Situation 
The answers to several questions on the post-experimental ques-
tionnaire provided assurance that the attorneys were perceiving the 
experimental manipulations as intended.18 Statistical analyses of re-
sponses to these questions revealed that attorneys who received client-
16. In fact, the purported vis-a-vis was not always physically present. This was 
necessary in order to allow random assignment of individuals to experimental condi-
tions, which, in turn, is necessary to allow examination of individual behavior. 
17. When the attorney had received court-centered instructions and was in a mixed 
system (i.e., with a client-centered vis-a-vis), the percentage of favorable facts was 
defined as the proportion of facts unfavorable to the contentions of the client-centered 
other. For court-centered attorneys with court-centered others it was necessary to arbi-
trarily define the percentage of "favorable facts" as the proportion of facts favorable 
to one of the parties. 
18. The significance of the results reported in this section, including ratings on 
the questionnaire and behavior in the experiment, was assessed by the appropriate 
multivariate or univariate analysis of variance technique. A difference between two 
experimental conditions is tested for statistical significance by comparing the magnitude 
of the difference to the variation within each condition. The difference is said to be 
"significant" if it would occur less than five times out of a hundred by chance alone 
{I\Titten as p < .05). Smaller values of "p" provide greater assurance that the difference 
was not the result of chance. Only those differences that are reported to be significant 
should be regarded as "true" or real differences. 
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centered instructions saw their own actions as less cooperative (p 
< .001), less fair (p < .002), less peaceful (p < .004), less likeable 
(p < .01), and more biased (p < .001) than did attorneys who re-
ceived court-centered instructions. These results verify that the client-
centered attorneys were indeed more contentious or adversarial in 
their approach to the case. The attorneys' views of their opponents' 
behavior similarly suggested an effective manipulation of their per-
ceptions of the other. Attorneys who were assigned client-centered 
opponents rated the other attorney as less cooperative (p < .001), less 
peaceful (p < .004), less likeable (p < .005), and more biased (p < 
.00 I) than did those facing court-centered attorneys. 
The degree to which the attorneys were aware of the distribution 
of favorable facts was assessed by a question asking them to estimate 
the distribution of favorable £acts from the total population of facts 
about the case. Responses to this question corresponded quite closely 
to the experimentally manipulated percentage of favorable facts.19 
B. Diligence of Investigation 
The willingness of attorneys to purchase facts from the experi-
menter served as an index of the diligence of investigation engen-
dered by the various experimental conditions. The average number 
of facts bought by attorneys in each of the conditions is presented 
in Table I. Analyses of these results revealed no statistically signifi-
TABLE 1 
AVERAGE NUMBER OF FACI'S PURCHASED BY INDIVIDUAL ATTORNEYS 
Percentage of Facts Favorable to Attorney 
25% 50% 75% 
Attorney's 
Opponent's Role Opponent's Role Opponent's Role 
Role Court Client Court Client Court Client 
Court 19.0 (8)a 21.5 (8) 21.6 (10) 23.6 (10) 23.5 (8) 22.5 (8) 
Client 24.5 (8) 27.5 (8) 22.4 (10) 19.6 (10) 19.5 (8) 17.0 (8) 
a Number of law students in each category is indicated in parentheses. 
cant differences in information search between client-centered attor-
neys and court-centered attorneys when the distribution of £acts was 
50 per cent or 75 per cent favorable (p > .10). When only 25 per cent 
19. The mean estimates of the percentage of favorable facts in the total population 
of facts were 31.1%, 51.7%, and 69.5% respectively, in the 25%, 50%, and 75% favor• 
able conditions. 
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of the discovered evidence was favorable, however, client-centered 
attorneys purchased significantly more facts than did court-centered 
attorneys (p < .033). 
C. Presentation of Evidence 
Attorney bias in the presentation of discovered evidence is de-
scribed by an index constructed to reflect the degree to which the 
attorneys did not transmit to the trier the same distribution of facts 
they received. The closer an index value is to +LOO, the more the 
attorney biased his presentation by transmitting a higher proportion 
of favorable facts than was present in the facts he discovered. Values 
close to zero indicate that the attorney transmitted approximately 
the same distribution of facts he discovered. The average values of 
this index in each of the conditions is reported in Table 2.20 Inspec-
TABLE 2 
PRESENTATION BIASING INDEX FOR INDIVIDUAL ATIORNEYS 
Percentage of Facts Favorable to Attorney 
25% 50% 75% 
Attorney's 
Opponent's Role Opponent's Role Opponent's Role 
Role Court Client Court Client Court Client 
Court .023 (8)R .010 (8) .013 (10) .063 (10) .007 (8) .147 (8) 
Client .948 (8) .812 (8) .969 (10) .883 (10) .941 (8) .857 (8) 
a Number of law students in each category is indicated in parentheses. 
tion of Table 2 reveals two statistically significant differences in the 
presentations of attorneys in the various experimental conditions. 
First, as might be expected, the values of the index were relatively 
high when the attorney's own role was client-centered and relatively 
low when the attorney's own role was court-centered. (p < .001). 
Client-centered attorneys transmitted almost no evidence contrary to 
their clients' interests, while court-centered attorneys transmitted vir-
tually the same distribution of facts they received during the inves-
tigation. 
Second, although the values of the index are quite high for all 
client-centered attorneys, the average value was lower when a client-
20. The index reported in Table 2 reflects the amount that the manipulated dis-
tribution changed in transmission relative to the amount of change possible. The 
results are essentially the same when the absolute amount of transmission change is 
used. 
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centered attorney confronted a client-centered opponent rather than 
a court-centered opponent (p < .03). 
This effect is evident from the values presented in the bottom 
row of Table 2. Apparently, when the opponent was client-centered, 
the attorney transmitted more facts that were unfavorable to his own 
client (according to the impartial scaling of facts)-a somewhat un-
expected finding.21 · 
The importance of these individual results is emphasized when 
arranged to show the effects of the varied roles and fact distributions 
upon all the information reaching the judge from both attorneys. 
These effects were assessed by matching in pairs the subjects whose 
joint role structures represented adversary, mixed, and inquisitorial 
legal systems.22 Adversary pairs consisted of two opposing client-
centered attorneys, mixed pairs consisted of one client-centered and 
one court-centered attorney, and inquisitorial pairs consisted of two 
court-centered attorneys. In each pair, the attorney matched the de-
scription of the other's vis-a-vis and discovered from the same pool of 
facts. The distribution of facts discovered by the pair is indicated by 
the numbers following the name of the system. For adversary and 
inquisitorial pairs the balanced fact distribution is indicated by 
"50%-50%," and the uneven fact distribution by "25%-75%." The 
distribution of facts received by mixed pairs is designated by "50%-
50%" for the balanced case, "25%-75%" for an unbalanced case un-
favorable to the client-centered attorney, and "75%-25%" for an un• 
balanced case favorable to the client-centered attomey.23 
21. A possible explanation for this effect may be advanced on the basis of social 
psychological research by Pepitone who found that individuals highly motivated in 
their attempts to achieve a desired goal tended to distort in a favorable direction any 
factors that might facilitate goal attainment. Pepitone, Motivational Effects in Social 
Perception, 3 HUMAN RELATIONS 57 (1950). Similarly, client-centered attorneys in this 
experiment may have been most highly motivated to work for a favorable verdict 
when they were actively opposed by client-centered opponents. If this was the case, 
these attorneys may have overestimated their ability to achieve the desired verdict by 
misinterpreting some of the unfavorable facts to render them favorable to their own 
clients. The transmission of these facts in the mistaken belief they were favorable could 
have caused the observed decrease in the objective index. There is some evidence from 
the questionnaire data that supports this explanation. A significant correlation was 
found between the transmission-biasing index and estimates of the over-all proportion 
of favorable facts. In this case the correlation revealed that attorneys who overestimated 
the over-all proportion of favorable facts tended also, to a degree greater than would 
be expected from chance, to transmit a lower proportion of favorable facts. This would 
be expected from the reinterpretation explanation since the reinterpretation of some 
unfavorable facts would result in lower values of the transmission biasing index and 
higher estimates of the over-all proportion of favorable facts. The value of the correla-
tion was - .60. 
22. The composition of the pairs was necessary because of the procedure described 
in note 16 supra. 
23. The seven possible pair situations are listed on the top row of Table 3. 
TABLE 3 
PRESENTATION CHARACTERISTICS OF UGAL SYSTEMS IN THE EXPERIMENT 
Legal System and Percentage of Facts Favorable to the Attorneys 
Inquisitorial Mixed Adversary Inquisitorial Mixed Mixed 
50%-50% 50%-50% 50%-50% 25%•75% 25%·75% 75%-25% 
Presentation Biasing Index For Pairs .024 (5)n .103 (10) .041 (5) .017 (8) .132 (8) .084 (8) 
Number of Unique Facts Presented by Pairs 19.80 20.30 18.80 19.88 20.25 19.25 
n Number of pairs of law students in each category is indicated in parentheses. 
Adversary 
25%-75% 
.ll4 (8) 
18.13 
e .... 
<.O 
~ 
t::l ~-
~ 
~ 
-Q, 
@1 .... 
i:::i.. 
§ 
~ 
..... ..... 
(.)Q 
--.:t 
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Table 3 presents average values for two characteristics of the pairs' 
presentation of evidence to the trier. The first row reports the alter-
ation or biasing in the pairs' transmissions of the discovered distri-
bution of information. That is, values of this index greater than zero 
indicate that the distribution of facts the pair presented to the judge 
differed from the distribution discovered during the investigation. 
Analysis of this index revealed distinct patterns of alteration for each 
of the three legal systems. As may be seen from the table, the average 
values of the index were relatively high for mixed pairs regardless of 
the distribution of facts discovered by these pairs. Inspection of the 
presentations upon which this distortion index was based revealed 
that the biasing of the fact distribution consistently favored the client-
centered attorney; the information that mixed pairs transmitted to 
the judge contained a higher proportion of facts favorable to the 
claims of the party represented by the client-centered attorney than 
was present in the original, experimentally controlled distribution 
of evidence. Inquisitorial pairs, in contrast, almost perfectly reflected 
the distribution they discovered, as indicated by the relatively low 
average values of the index for these pairs. Again, the original distri-
bution of facts did not affect the degree of biasing. 
Adversary role structures produced more complex effects upon 
the distribution of facts reaching the trier than did inquisitorial and 
mixed role structures. When the original distribution of evidence 
was balanced, the presentations of adversary pairs, like the transmis-
sions of inquisitorial pairs, almost perfectly reflected the original dis-
tribution, indicated by the relatively low average values in the top 
row of Table 3, for both adversary 50%-50% and inquisitorial 50%-
50% pairs. However, when the original distribution of facts was 
uneven, adversary pairs did not present the same distribution of 
evidence they discovered, as may be seen from the high average value 
of the biasing index (.114) for adversary 25%-75% pairs. In this case, 
inspection of the transmissions revealed that adversary pairs with un-
even original fact distributions altered the distribution to render 
them more favorable to the attorney whose contentions were least 
supported by the original distribution of evidence. 
In summary, inquisitorial pairs presented to the trier approxi-
mately the same distribution of facts they discovered: If the distri-
bution discovered was 50%-50%, the distribution presented was 
about 50%-50%; if the original distribution was 25%-75%, the dis-
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tribution presented was 25%-75%. Mixed pairs consistently biased 
the evidence distribution in favor of the party represented by a client-
centered attorney: If the original distribution was 50%-50%, the dis-
tribution presented was 60%-40%,24 if the original distribution was 
25%-75%, the presented distribution was approximately 33%-67%, 
and if the original distribution was 75%-25%, the presented distri-
bution was 88%-12%. Adversary pairs altered the evidence distribu-
tion only when one party was disadvantaged, and always in favor of 
that party. Thus, if the original distribution was 50%-50%, the pre-
sented distribution was also approximately 50%-50%, but if the 
original distribution was 25%-75%, the presented evidence distribu-
tion was about 36%-64%.25 
The second row of numbers in Table 3 reports the number of 
unique facts in the presentations by pairs of attorneys. 26 Statistical 
analysis of these data revealed no reliable differences between any of 
the seven possible combinations of legal systems and original evi-
dence distributions (p < .50). 
D. Perception of the Legal Situation 
In addition to assessing the effectiveness of the experimental 
manipulations, the responses to the post-experimental questionnaire 
also provided data on the attorneys' psychological reactions to the 
various conditions created within the experiment. The responses to 
one question-asking for ratings of the "fairness" of the other at-
torney's actions-showed a particularly interesting, but rather com-
plex pattern. When the distribution of facts was balanced (p < .01) 
or unfavorable to their opponent (p < .05), court-centered attorneys 
rated the actions of client-centered opponents to be less fair than the 
actions of court-centered opponents. However, when the distribution 
was favorable to the opponent (i.e., when 75 per cent of the facts 
favored the opponent's contentions and only 25 per cent of the facts 
were unfavorable to his position), no difference in the ratings of 
client-centered and court-centered opposing attorneys was detected. 
24. The first percentage represents the proportion of evidence favorable to the 
client-centered attorney. 
25. This perspective of the results was developed independently of the biasing 
index by direct examination of the distributions of evidence presented by pairs in the 
various conditions. Since these values were generated from the same data used to 
compute the biasing index, the meaning of the results is substantially the same. 
26. Each fact was counted only once, whether it was presented by one or both 
attorneys. 
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Apparently court-centered attorneys, constrained to nonadversary 
presentation of evidence, felt that partisan advocacy by the other at-
torney was unfair if the evidence discovered did not obviously sup-
port the other's position. But when the discovered distribution of 
evidence actually supported the position advocated by the other 
attorney, the advocacy was congruent with the court-centered at-
torney's own opinion and apparently was not seen as unfair. 
Client-centered attorneys perceived the actions of client-centered 
others as less fair than the actions of court-centered others only when 
the discovered distribution of facts was unfavorable to the attorney 
himself (p < .01). There was no difference in the fairness ratings of 
client-centered others and court-centered others when the attorney 
himself was client-centered and the distribution of facts was balanced 
or favorable. The actions of the other attorney, then, were seen as 
relatively unfair by client-centered attorneys when both the distribu-
tion of evidence and the contentions of the other opposed the at-
torney's position. Attorneys in this unpleasant situation may have 
felt that there was little need for the other to behave in an adversary 
manner, even though he had been assigned such a role.27 
IV. DISCUSSION 
The results of this study suggest that the characteristics of legal 
systems may be quite different from the characteristics legal theorists 
have postulated, at least with regard to the discovery and presenta-
tion of evidence. For example, implicit in the statement that in an 
adversary role structure "the likelihood is maximized that all rele-
vant facts will be ferreted out ... "28 is the assumption that client-
centered attorneys are generally more diligent in their investigation 
of a case. But no pervasive difference due to the attorney's role was 
observed in the information-search phase of this experiment. Only 
when the distribution of facts was unfavorable to the client-centered 
27. The experimental analogs of the adversary, mixed, and inquisitorial systems 
created within the context of this study were "pure" or ideal examples of the situa-
tions produced by various combinations of attorney roles. It is necessary that the reader, 
in contemplating the results of the study and the discussion of these results, remem-
ber that the application of these findings to particular real legal systems is dependent 
not only upon the usual constraints of scientific generalization, but also upon the 
extent to which the real system in question approaches in its characteristics the rele-
vant "pure" example. 
28. See text accompanying note 5 supra. 
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attorneys did these attorneys seek more information than court-cen-
tered attorneys. 
The fact-search differences noted above may be explained by 
considering the information requirements of attorneys in the differ-
ent experimental conditions.29 Facts were useful to court-centered at-
torneys to the extent the facts aided them in forming a stable belief 
about the case. Court-centered attorneys, with their interest in a fair 
and just decision, could be expected to cease their fact search as soon 
as they became confident of their assessment of the legal conflict. For 
client-centered attorneys, in contrast, the major utility of the facts 
lay in obtaining a favorable verdict. Thus, it is not surprising that 
the discovered fact distribution affected the information search of 
client-centered attorneys more than it affected the information search 
of court-centered attorneys. It appears that client-centered attorneys 
who found the initial distribution of facts to be favorable or bal-
anced were content to cease their investigation relatively early (i.e., 
at about the same point as court-centered attorneys). When the dis-
tribution of evidence was obviously unfavorable to the client-cen-
tered attorney, however, the utility of any available favorable facts 
was especially high. Only by continuing their investigations long 
enough to acquire a relatively large supply of favorable facts could 
client-centered attorneys with difficult cases hope to win a verdict.30 
As will be seen below, the relatively extensive investigation engen-
dered by the combination of a client-centered role and an unfavor-
able distribution of facts produced the major distinctive feature of 
information presentation by adversary legal systems. 
It was noted earlier that, contrary to the assumption of adversary 
system theorists, no reliable differences were obtained in the number 
of unique facts attorneys transmitted to the legal decision maker in 
the experimental analogs of inquisitorial, mixed, and adversary legal 
systems. But each legal system exerted a distinctive efject upon the 
distribution of evidence presented to the decision maker. The distri-
bution of the facts presented to the trier by inquisitorial pairs was 
29. This explanation is based primarily upon a theoretical analysis by Kelley and 
Thibaut of the processes involved in group problem solving, of which the legal 
situation is a special case. See Kelley &: Thibaut, Group Problem Solving, in 4 THE 
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY I (2d ed. G. Lindzey &: E. Aronson 1969). 
30. More extensive search for information when the information is presumed to 
have high utility has been found in previous studies. See Canon, Self-Confidence and 
Selective Exposure to Information, in CoNFucr, DECISION AND DISSONANCE 83 (L. 
Festinger ed. 1964) and Freedman, Confidence, Utility, and Selective Exposure: A 
Partial Replication, 2 J. PERSONALITY&: SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 778 (1965). 
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virtually identical to the distribution discovered by the attorneys, 
regardless of the nature of the original distribution. The outstanding 
characteristic of inquisitorial systems, then, is the lack of any change 
in the distribution of facts during discovery and transmission by the 
attorneys. Such "unbiased" presentation may, of course, create prob-
lems. If, for some reason, the evidentiary distribution discovered by 
the attorneys is not representative of the "true" or total distribution 
of all evidence, the inaccuracy will be retained in the attorneys' pre-
sentation. In other words, the inquisitorial model does not systemati-
cally compensate for "sampling error."31 
The presentations by mixed pairs of attorneys showed consistent 
bias in favor of the party who was represented by the client-centered 
attorney.32 This bias probably resulted from the transmission of all 
available favorable facts by the client-centered attorneys and the 
transmission of only some of the available facts unfavorable to the 
client-centered attorney by court-centered attorneys. The mixed sys-
tem appears to serve best when conditions require a consistent deci-
sion-making bias in favor of one party to the legal conflict. For ex-
ample, if public policy demands that a constant advantage be given 
the defendant in criminal proceedings regardless of the apparent 
distribution of evidence, the use of a mixed-role structure and the 
designation of the client-centered attorney as defense counsel may 
best realize the principle. 
Equally reliable, but more complex, was the biasing pattern of 
adversary pairs. When the original evidentiary distribution was bal-
anced, no biasing of the distribution was observed. When the origi-
nal distribution was uneven, however, the adversary role structure 
resulted in a bias favoring the party whose contentions were least 
supported by the initial distribution of evidence. This "conditional" 
bias in the presentations of adversary pairs appears to be caused by 
31. The term "sampling error," as used here, refers to the possibility that the 
distribution of discovered evidence is not identical, for some reason irrelevant to the 
basic legal question, to the distribution of all evidence about the case. Sampling error 
is a major concern of statistical decision theory, which attempts to discriminate actual 
differences in the distributions of scientific evidence from differences occurring by 
chance. See G. FERGUSON, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS IN PSYCHOLOGY AND EDUCATION 135-37, 
144-46 (1966); R. YOUNG & D. VELDMAN, INTRODUCTORY STATISTICS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL 
SCIENCES 109-11 (1965). 
32. The distribution of evidence in the presentations of these pairs was approxi-
mately 10% more favorable to the client-centered attorney than was the original, 
discovered distribution-an effect that was observed in all tested initial distributions 
See text accompanying note 25 supra. 
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the more diligent investigation of adversary attorneys who were con-
fronted with unfavorable fact distributions. By accumulating and 
then presenting a relatively large number of favorable facts, these 
attorneys were able to render the distribution presented by their pair 
more favorable to their own clients' interests. Therefore, the adver-
sary role structure seems most congruent with a public policy re-
quiring overwhelming proof before a verdict can be rendered. In con-
trast to the inquisitorial model, the adversary system systematically 
compensates for possible sampling error.33 The presentation bias evi-
dent with adversary systems serves to decrease the impact of any de-
viations in the discovered distribution of evidence from the "true" 
or total distribution. Thus, one important function of the adversary 
system may be to eliminate chance differences in the distribution of 
favorable evidence. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This experiment suggests several important conclusions about in-
formation processing in an adversary system. First, the adversary sys-
tem apparently does not provoke a generally more vigorous search 
for facts, but does instigate significantly more thorough investigation 
by advocates initially confronted with plainly unfavorable evidence. 
Thus, the claimed general investigatory advantage for the system ap-
pears to be limited, but limited to situations of great social and hu-
manitarian concern. Second, the total number of unique facts pre-
sented to the fact finder is apparently not greater in an adversary 
system than in the ideal alternative systems. However, this study 
identified a major, and heretofore unsuspected, effect of adversary 
decision making: The model introduces a systematic evidentiary bias 
in favor of the party disadvantaged by the discovered facts. In a crim-
inal case this process may work to the advantage of the prosecution 
or the defense; the distortion introduced is in favor of the underdog, 
regardless of identity.34 This characteristic of an adversary system 
stands in significant contrast to a mixed system of decision making, 
which introduces a systematic bias in favor of the party represented 
by an advocate (typically a criminal defendant), and to the inquisi-
torial system, which apparently introduces no distortion in the pre-
33. However, there is a cost associated with this protection. If the discovered dis-
tribution is an accurate representation of all the facts about the case, the full 
strength of the favored party's claim will not be evident. 
34. It seems likely that the same effect would occur in civil litigation. 
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sented facts. This systematic effect of the adversary system on the 
factual basis for decision is a product that must be given careful con-
sideration in any general evaluation of the quality of the adversary 
system. 
